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BERNARD H. SIEGAN*
This paper is an edited version of an address delivered by the
author on December 14, 1991 at a conference on "Prosperity and
the Rule of Law" in the Washington, D.C. area. Professor Siegan
advocates that the new constitutions of the former communist na-
tions and republics should establish political systems consistent
with the general objective of their revolutions: to minimize the
rule of the state and maximize the liberty of the people. These
constitutions can best provide for freedom and abundance by sub-
stantially limiting the power of government.
In recent years, our world has experienced an extraordinary his-
torical event that few, if any, had ever forecast: almost simultane-
ously, millions of people in many countries shed despotism in favor
of freedom. They demolished a system which smothered their hu-
manity and their opportunity for progress and betterment. In the en-
tire history of freedom, there never has been so great an advance
within so brief a period.
What a horrible tragedy it would be if governments were now es-
tablished that would return these people to the oppressions from
which they escaped. I do not speak idly for I have observed and lis-
tened to American advisors who counsel the adoption of constitutions
and laws that might bring about such a terrible result. It should by
now be clear that these revolutions were against an evil system and
not evil rulers. They were intended to minimize the rule of the state
and maximize the freedom of the people. Those who now advocate
establishing strong government controls in these nations do not com-
prehend the meaning of what has occurred.
Government should be powerful enough to protect the people
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against their foreign and local enemies and domestic perils and ex-
cesses. It must never be powerful enough to oppress the people or
inhibit their wisdom and creativity. In the words of the United
States Supreme Court:
To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the [United
States] Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt it;
for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better served than by the
preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent
members.'
Principles of freedom should guide the liberated nations and re-
publics in framing their constitutions. A constitution is the most im-
portant legal document for a nation that subscribes to the rule of
law. The drafting of a constitution serves not only to frame a legal
document but more important to create a.system of government. In
its constitution, a nation defines the relationship between the people
and their government. In rejecting tyranny, the people of Eastern
Europe have salvaged and preserved the rights to which they are
entitled as human beings. They should now constitutionally enshrine
these rights forever.2
This paper primarily considers constitutional provisions that are
required to establish and maintain a free, viable, and abundant econ-
omy, provisions relating to property and economic matters. This dis-
cussion will also consider other constitutional provisions that are
necessary to create an environment favorable to ownership and
investment.
A nation cannot exist if it does not exist economically. To prosper,
a nation committed to a market economy must encourage ownership
and investment. A constitution that protects liberties will not only
promote investment by the nation's residents but will also draw in-
ternational investment. Investors avoid nations that confiscate prop-
erty, are economically irresponsible, and repress people. In the
competition for international investment, nations that strongly secure
life, liberty, and property are far ahead in attracting industry and
trade.
PROVISIONS GENERALLY SECURING ECONOMIC LIBERTIES
In addition to specific protections guaranteeing property and eco-
nomic interests, a constitution should contain other constitutional
provisions that are also essential to secure economic liberties.
First, separation of powers. The constitution should separate and
limit the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial parts of
1. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
2. See generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, DRAFTING A CONSTITUTION FOR A NATION
OR REPUBLIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM (1992).
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government. In addition to functioning separately, each of the three
branches of government should have the power to check and balance
the others. The objective of the separation of powers is two-fold;
first, to diffuse and disperse authority, to make it very difficult for
any group to obtain great power over the government, and second, to
ensure greater and diverse consideration of proposed laws. If govern-
mental powers are divided so that a particular policy can be imple-
mented only by a combination of legislative enactment, executive
implementation, and judicial interpretation, no group of persons will
be able to impose its will. It is also likely that measures surviving
this process will serve the nation better than those that do not.
Thus, under the United States Constitution, a measure passed by
Congress can be vetoed by the President or annulled as unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court. The framers of our Constitution be-
lieved that when unlimited power is lodged in either a king or a
parliament regardless of how well intentioned either may be, there is
considerable risk that it will be exercised tyrannically. The rights of
life, liberty, and property are too precious to be left entirely to the
wisdom or mercy of the legislature.
Second, the constitution should establish a judicial branch with
the power to secure constitutional terms and provisions. The people
of every country are supreme in their sovereignty except they must
defer to individuals exercising their natural and fundamental liber-
ties. The protection of liberty requires an independent judiciary pow-
erful enough to monitor the legislative and executive branches to
assure compliance with the constitution. When interpreting the con-
stitution, the judiciary should have only the power to invalidate laws,
not the power to impose them.
Third, the constitution should protect the liberties of the people
from oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, and capricious laws and reg-
ulations. The document should enumerate freedoms of the people
thought especially worthy of protection. Because a constitution is a
result of a'political process and usually remains in force for a long
period of time, it is almost inevitable that not all liberties will be
listed. Moreover, definitions are not always precise and might change
over time. To avoid these problems, the judiciary should have the
power to secure both enumerated and unenumerated liberties. How-
ever, as will be explained more fully later in this paper, the judicial
role must be limited to protecting people from oppression. Govern-
ment should have no constitutional obligation to support, advance, or
otherwise subsidize people.
Fourth, because liberties are not absolute, the constitution should
provide a formula that the judiciary must apply in determining when
government legislation or regulation violates individual or corporate
liberties. A law that restrains freedom would be needless or harmful
or both if it will not achieve its intended public purpose or is exces-
sive in its impact. Thus, to uphold restraints it imposes upon human
freedom, the government should have the burden of persuading a
court: first, that the objective of the law or regulation is within the
power of the government body that adopted it; second, that the re-
straint in question is also within the power of the government body
that adopted it and will substantially achieve its objective; third, that
the consequences of the restraint are not out of proportion to its ben-
efits; and fourth, that the same objective cannot be achieved by a
law less harmful to liberty.
These rules, borrowed from courts in the United States and other
western nations, make certain that the people are not arbitrarily or
capriciously deprived of their rights to life, liberty, and property. I
shall explain their application more fully later in this paper.
THE SUCCESS OF FREE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Thus far, I have discussed constitutional principles that are not
very controversial among American constitutional scholars. The
same is not true for what follows since I am going to discuss with
you more specifically the protection of property and economic liber-
ties, and many in the constitutional community distinguish and
maintain a dichotomy between intellectual-political rights on the one
side and material rights on the other. These scholars generally reject
government restraints on intellectual and political activities yet ac-
cept quite willingly (sometimes even eagerly) much stronger re-
straints on economic activities.
However, this dichotomy is not suited to a free state. Government
is not more wise or humane when it regulates economics than when
it regulates speech, press, or religion. In barring economic freedoms,
the communist dictatorships denied people both their human rights
and the material abundance that results when individuals exercise
freely their talents and abilities.
The tendency of some constitutional scholars to prefer regulation
of the economy is remarkable. On an intellectual level, the superior-
ity of freedom over authority in the economic market has clearly
won the lengthy debate. The best evidence of this is the millions of
people who renounced the communist systems in large part for eco-
nomic reasons. In recent years, five Nobel prizes in economics were
awarded economists who maintain that securing economic liberties is
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essential to the economic viability of the modern state. These schol-
ars are Fredrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stigler, James
Buchanan, and Ronald Coase.
The difference in material outcome between free and command
systems is readily apparent to any observer. Measured by living stan-
dards and total output, the economic systems of East Germany,
China, and North Korea were disasters compared to those of West
Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea. The results are little different
when similar comparisons are made everywhere else in the world.
Rejection of economic regression and stagnation was a major factor
in the people's repudiation of communism.
Studies show the vast differences in outcome between economic
systems. Thus, Professor Gerald Scully measured the success of open
and closed societies and concluded that nations that have chosen to
suppress economic, political, and civil liberties have gravely reduced
the standard of living of their citizens. By contrast material progress
is greatest if individuals have the right to pursue their affairs un-
molested by the state. According to Scully's studies, politically open
societies, which bind themselves to the rule of law, to private prop-
erty, and to the private allocation of resources grew at three times
more (2.73 to 0.91 percent annually) and were two and one half
times as efficient as societies where those freedoms are circumscribed
or prescribed.3
ECONOMIC REGULATION REDUCES BENEFITS OF THE ECONOMIC
MARKETPLACE
Moreover, the more freedom in the marketplace the more likely it
will better provide for the people. Contemporary economic studies
show that in the United States, government regulation of economic
markets very often operates negatively, its disadvantages outweigh
its advantages. The legal restraints on economic activity do more
harm than good.
In my book, Economic Liberties and the Constitution,4 I have
summarized fifty-three studies of government regulation, by more
than sixty individual and institutional researchers, which have ap-
peared in the most prestigious scholarly literature. These studies
show that although every regulation accomplishes some purpose, the
3. Gerald W. Scully, The Institutional Framework and Economic Development,
96-3 J. POL. ECON. 661 (1988).
4. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
great majority fail a cost/benefit analysis. The vast bulk of these
scholars favor either total or substantial deregulation of the area
under study.
As revealed in these studies, much regulation has resulted in the
reduction of economic efficiency, misallocation of resources, and re-
distribution of income from the consumer to the regulated group.
Considered as a whole, regulation seriously limits the nation's pro-
ductivity and output. A common finding in these studies is that the
regulation under study raises prices, first, by restricting the market
from competition, and second, by imposing a variety of unnecessary
requirements on producers and sellers that increase cost. People of
average and lesser income, those least able to afford higher prices,
are the most adversely affected.
Consider in this regard the comments of Professor Ronald Coase,
1991 Nobel prize winner in economics, who was for a long time the
editor of the very highly respected Journal of Law & Economics.
The Journal published numerous studies on economic regulation over
the years, and Coase concludes:
The main lesson to be drawn from these studies is clear: they all tend to
suggest that the regulation is either ineffective or that, when it has a notice-
able impact, on balance the effect is bad, so that consumers obtain a worse
product or a higher-priced product or both as a result of the regulation.
Indeed, this result is found so uniformly as to create a puzzle: one would
expect to find, in all these studies, at least some government programs that
do more good than harm.5
The experience of government regulation in the United States
reveals the great difficulty of maintaining economic- freedoms in
democratic societies. Economic regulation emanates chiefly from two
different sources. The first source is those people who demand the
passage of laws to remedy what they see as problems in the eco-
nomic system. They are motivated by ideological or more general
public interest reasons. Members of this group do not directly benefit
from the laws they propose or favor.
The second source of economic regulation is those individuals and
corporations who seek regulation in their own self-interest. Most of
the people in this group are in business, trades, or professions. They
want regulations imposed to limit competition usually as a means of
obtaining more income for themselves.
The second group accounts for a great deal of regulation - per-
haps most of it. In a representative society, legislators are highly re-
ceptive to the demands of their constituents. As a result a relatively
small number of persons seeking to obtain monetary gains have con-
siderable opportunity to do so. Judge Richard Posner has suggested
5. Ronald Coase, Economists and Public Policy, in LARGE CORPORATIONS IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 169, 184 (J. Fred Weston ed., 1974).
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that the lawmaking process creates a market for legislation in which
politicians "sell" legislative protection to those who could help their
electoral prospects with money or votes or both. 6
Professor Michael Granfield has likened the legislature to a gen-
eral store whose inventory includes monopolies, preferences, and con-
cessions. The politician sells these goods, as any astute store owner
would, to the group offering the highest price. The arrangement does
not necessarily include bribery or any other illegal activity. It may
simply involve a legal contribution from a business group or a prom-
ise of votes or services from a "public interest" group. 7
The process that leads to legislation benefitting comparatively few
people is not difficult to understand. Those who would be helped
monetarily by statute have the incentive to wage a strong lobbying
effort, whereas those who would bear the cost without sharing the
benefits frequently do not have sufficient personal stake to fight for
their position. The concentration of benefits provides a special inter-
est group with an incentive for creating a narrow political lobby,
whose small size makes organizing relatively easy.
On the other side, a larger number of citizens are involved; they
are often widely dispersed and frequently have little or no knowledge
of the proposed laws or the probable effects. Further, the costs of the
legislation are spread so that few persons suffer very much, which
limits incentive to organize. As a consequence, the costs of spending
measures, subsidies, and special economic preferences are passed
along, often to an unknowing and uncomplaining public.
In this environment, the well being of property owners and entre-
preneurs can be precarious. Reform groups which reject or distrust
market mechanisms, and business interests which seek to eliminate
competition, have considerable opportunity to achieve their goals,
particularly when they have common aims, as they often do.
The protection of owners and entrepreneurs from the power and
might of these special economic interests demands both insertion of
economic guarantees in a constitution and the existence of a judici-
ary with the power to enforce them.
One reason for the proliferation of regulations in the United
States is that the United States Supreme Court has for a long time
not protected commercial liberties. Earlier in this century, the Su-
preme Court protected these liberties, but subsequently interpreted
6. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 405 (2d ed. 1977).
7. Michael Granfield, Changing Industries and Economic Performance, in LARGE
CORPORATIONS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 145, 164-65.
our Constitution as not authorizing this practice. However, the Court
does secure the rights of property ownership.
SECURING THE ECONOMIC MARKET
The United States experience should persuade the new nations
and republics to draft constitutions that, unlike ours, will contain
provisions clearly guaranteeing property and economic rights. Ac-
cordingly, let us now consider the content of constitutional provisions
to protect a free economic market.
To begin with, a constitution protecting property and economic in-
terests should limit government ownership. Excepting that which it
presently owns or operates, government should not own or operate
any commercial enterprise. Not only is a government not competent
in this. area, but it also has the incentive when it is so engaged to
pass laws that will impede its private competitors.
The legislature should have no power to pass laws permitting the
national or any local government to own land or buildings except
those to be used solely for absolutely essential public services, such
as streets, public schools, and police and fire stations. In the event
the national or any local government seeks to purchase land or build-
ings for such purposes and the owner refuses to sell, a court should
have power to enter an order conveying the property to the govern-
ment but only upon its paying the owner full market value for the
asset and full compensation for any other economic loss sustained by
the owner as a consequence of the government's action. In my opin-
ion, these objectives are fully consistent with the provision in the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.""
The constitution must otherwise secure property, economic, and
contract interests.
First, property rights. Every persoh should have the right, individ-
ually or in combination with others, to purchase, rent, own, use,
mortgage, sell, lease, transfer, bequeath, and inherit private prop-
erty, or any part or portion thereof. Private property includes any
asset or thing of value, whether tangible or intangible, real or
personal.
Second, economic rights. Every person should have the right, indi-
vidually or in combination with others, freely to practice the occupa-
tion, profession, or trade of his or her choice, freely to establish,
8. The reader should be aware that the United States Supreme Court has not al-
ways accepted such an interpretation of the Takings Clause. Compare Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) with Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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maintain, and operate a commercial enterprise, and freely to produce
and distribute goods and services.
And third, contract rights. Every person should have the right, in-
dividually or in combination with others, to enter freely into binding
agreements containing only provisions of their choice.
To be sure, some regulation that restricts economic activity is jus-
tified under a market economy. Few will reject regulation that truly
secures public health and safety, prohibits noxious uses, and main-
tains law and order in real emergencies. Government regulation
should be limited to forbidding private activity that actually violates
the rights of others. The proper role for government is to protect the
public from such harms, and not to prohibit or diminish individual
production, wisdom, or creativity. The formula previously set forth
to determine when regulation is constitutionally valid should be ap-
plied in the economic area with these objectives in mind.
As an example of how the said formula should be construed, con-
sider the situation presented in the Minnesota plastic bottle case.9
This case involved a 1977 Minnesota law prohibiting the retail sale
of milk in plastic, non-returnable, non-refillable containers. The sale
of milk in paperboard cartons was not affected. The plastic bottle
manufacturers and retailers sued to declare the law unconstitutional
on the basis that it denied them their liberties to produce and dis-
tribute plastic milk bottles, a legitimate item of commerce.
The first issue considered by the trial court in the case was
whether the law promoted a public purpose. (The court found this to
be a requirement to sustain a statute challenged as violating eco-
nomic rights.) To recapitulate, economic regulations are imposed for
one or both of the following reasons: first, to cause the economic
system to function better - that is, to remedy or remove the ex-
cesses or limitations of the private market; second, to secure an eco-
nomic advantage for a person, corporation or group by the
elimination or reduction of competing businesses, occupations, prod-
ucts, or services.
If the court finds the second reason is controlling in a particular
situation, then the law in question does not promote a public pur-
pose. Not only does it deny liberty, it also reduces competition and
production and increases costs, disadvantaging the vast majority and
9. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). The United
States Supreme Court sustained the Minnesota statute which was declared unconstitu-
tional for the reasons explained in the text by both the trial and supreme court of the
state.
benefiting only a small number. It takes from A and gives to B for
the benefit of B. In the Minnesota bottle case, the state trial court
found that the "actual basis [for the act] was to promote the eco-
nomic interests of certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood
industries at the expense of the economic interests of other segments
of the dairy industry and the plastics industry." 10 It accordingly held
the law unconstitutional as contrary to the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses; essentially that the Constitution prohibited the
legislature from giving prefered treatment to any particular group.
However, suppose the court finds that the law seeks to increase
competition and productivity, to eliminate waste, or to enhance the
environment. These are legitimate and important governmental
objectives and meet the first test. The next test is whether the law is
likely to achieve these objectives - the means-ends test. Unlike the
trial court, the Minnesota Supreme Court assumed that the purposes
of the bottle law were legitimate - to enhance the environment, to
conserve energy and resources, and so on - but found it would not
achieve these purposes. Therefore, the restraint on liberty accom-
plished little other than harming the plastic milk bottle producers
and distributors. The court held that "the evidence conclusively dem-
onstrates that the discrimination against plastic nonrefillables is not
rationally related to the act's objectives.""1
CONSTITUTIONALLY LIMITING THE IMPOSITION OF TAXES
Let us now turn to consideration of public taxes. Like regulation,
taxation can also strangle the economy. The amount of the tax bur-
den is one factor an investor will consider in deciding whether or not
to invest. Taxes add to the cost of production and cost of living. The
greater the total taxes, the greater the negative impact on work, in-
vestment, and ownership. For example, if taxes lower the investor's
net return by fifty percent, the deterrent impact will be much greater
than at twenty percent.
If investment is reduced as a result of taxation or goes into the
tax-free underground economy, the country's tax revenues will be
lowered. By contrast, income tax revenues collected from the rich in
the United States in the 1980s increased notwithstanding that in-
come tax rates were reduced. In the 1980s, the Congress decreased
rates and made other changes in tax laws reducing considerably indi-
vidual tax liability. The tax revenue collected from the top 10% of
earners rose from 150.6 billion in 1981 to 199.8 billion in 1988, an
increase of 32.7 % measured in constant dollars. For the top 5 % of
10. Clover Leaf Creamery Company v. State of Minnesota, County of Ramsey
District Court, Second Judicial District, No. 423258 (1978).
11. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 289 N.W.2d 79, 82 (1979).
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earners, the increase in tax revenues in this period was 44.1 %. Total
tax revenues for this period increased by 11.7 % in constant dollars.
Similarly, after the 1964 tax cut of about 20%, the revenues col-
lected from the top 5 % of earners rose from 17.17 billion in 1963 to
18.49 billion in 1965, an increase of 7.7% in constant dollars. Total
tax revenues for this period slightly decreased by 0.3 %.12
By reason of both tax reductions, the collections from the wealthy
grew because they expanded their investment activities, offsetting
the amounts they saved as a result of the tax rate reductions.
Taxes have an adverse impact on the incentive to invest and work,
economic efficiency and aggregate output. Of course, they also in-
crease the incentive to engage in tax avoidance activities, such as
concocting tax shelters or entering and utilizing the underground
economy.
Recognizing the impediments of taxation, a great many countries
in recent years reduced considerably their maximum marginal tax
rates on individuals. High tax rates remain an international problem.
Mexico, for example, reduced its top income tax rate from sixty to
thirty-five percent; yet economist David Goldman estimates that col-
lected revenues in that country are only fifteen percent of what they
would be if the government enacted lower rates and simplified the
tax code.' 3
Spending to achieve the collective good is completely counter-
productive when it results in taxation that limits significantly eco-
nomic output -. and thereby the collective good. Because the
pressures for government spending are very great in democratic
countries, constitutional controls over spending and taxes are essen-
tial. One American politician facetiously asserts that only women
should be legislators because nature has endowed them with the will
to say no. Seriously though, constitutional restraints on spending are
required to control politicians' natural tendencies to please the
voters.
Constitutions should not prescribe tax systems or programs. This
is the responsibility of the elected branches of government. But a
constitution must protect the people from confiscatory and arbitrary
laws, regardless of the subject of these laws. Here then are sugges-
tions for constitutional provisions concerning taxation and spending:
12. JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC CHOICE 117-21 (6th ed. 1992).
13. David Asman, The Salinas Reforms Take Root, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1991, at
A12.
1. The maximum amount of annual taxes on real property or on a
commercial venture shall not exceed one percent of the full market
value of such property or venture. (California's Constitution limits
the maximum amount of ad valorem taxes on real property to one
percent of its full cash value.)
14
2. The total amount of tax revenues collected in any one year
should not exceed a specified percentage of the gross domestic in-
come of the nation for the prior year, except with the consent of two-
thirds of the legislature.
3. The national government should not incur indebtedness or lia-
bility in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the
income and revenues received for such year, except with the consent
of two-thirds of the legislature.
4. When for any year, total revenues received by the government
exceeds total outlays, the surplus should be used to reduce the
amount levied for the subsequent year.
5. The president or chief executive officer of the nation should
have the power to veto specific taxes or spending items either as part
of a general or a specific veto power. This power is referred to as a
line item veto. The legislature should be able to override such a veto
with a two-thirds majority.
SECURING ONLY LIBERTIES AND NOT BENEFITS
Let me now turn to another aspect of constitutional economic pro-
tections: A constitution should secure only liberties and not entitle-
ments. The United States Constitution has often been referred to as
a bill of rights, and there are two reasons for this: First, the govern-
ment has no authority to deprive persons of their liberties. Second,
persons are guaranteed liberties to engage in activities of their
choice.
These protections are intended to eliminate laws that restrict the
exercise of human liberties. The U.S. Constitution does not impose
affirmative economic obligations on the government or on the private
sector. Unlike some constitutions, it does not provide entitlements to
housing, education, medical service, or clean environment; it does not
mandate adequate standards of living, or periods of rest and leisure.
Our Constitution does not prohibit Congress or the state legisla-
tures from passing legislation to achieve these benefits. It simply
does not require such enactments.
Liberty in the United States Constitutional sense means being se-
cure from government oppression. To constitutionally secure social
14. CAL. CONST. art. III A, § I.
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or economic benefits requires subordinating individual liberties to no-
tions of the collective good, while under the United States Constitu-
tion the protection of individual liberty is the major goal.
A constitution that protects both liberties and entitlements is inco-
herent and very difficult to interpret since the judicial interpreter
will not know at any one time whether to reduce or expand govern-
ment authority. Moreover, guarantees of entitlements in a constitu-
tion that also provides for judicial review will impede the judiciary's
protection of liberty. Enabling the judiciary to guarantee entitle-
ments is a power dangerous to democracy. To enforce entitlements
the judiciary might have to mandate imposition of taxation and
spending, and neither the people nor the legislature would be able to
control this power.
15
The judiciary would be given dictatorial control over important
spending decisions. Taxing and spending the receipts are peculiarly
legislative powers, stemming from the idea that only the people, act-
ing on their own or through their representatives, are entitled to de-
cide how they will utilize their own funds. Similarly, a court may
implement provisions in a constitution that require a clean environ-
ment, adequate medical service, or fair wages by imposing personal
monetary requirements that reduce and limit the property or con-
tract rights of owners and enterpreneurs.
The communist regimes attempted to provide so many entitle-
ments that they had to subordinate or eliminate the fundamental
rights of life, liberty, and property. A major concern was to satisfy
and pay the government's generous entitlement obligations. Their
rulers sought to regulate almost every human activity to achieve the
common good; instead of producing a paradise, however, they cre-
ated virtual prisons. These prisons did not necessarily confine physi-
cal bodies, but they did incarcerate the resourcefulness and
inventiveness of the human mind.
The great lesson of our times is that the forces of production, con-
servation, and creativity rest principally in the intellectual and com-
mercial marketplaces and not in government. Thus, it may be true
that intellectuals and entrepreneurs act largely in their own self in-
terest, but probably no more so than people in government, and -the
15. In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that a court order
directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is a judicial act within the power
of federal court. The dissent objected that any judicial taxation order is an exercise of a
power that always has been thought legislative in nature. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.
33 (1990). I agree with the dissent and would accordingly recommend that constitutional
writers make certain that the judiciary is deprived of all authority to impose taxes.
incentives under which they operate are much more oriented to fur-
thering the general public good."6
CONCLUSION
The failure of the communist command economies demonstrate
that government institutions cannot provide adequately for the eco-
nomic needs and aspirations of the people. A market economy based
on private ownership and investment is the only alternative to the
command economy. For a market economy to succeed, a nation must
protect and encourage private initiative and risk taking. Regulation
must be limited and taxes must be low.
The liberated nations and republics face very difficult times. Broad
constitutional guarantees for economic freedom would be a giant ad-
vance toward a new and better life.
16. This view is consistent with the "public choice" perspective advanced by James
M. Buchanan, Nobel Laureate in Economics for 1986. He emphasizes self-interest as the
motivating factor in both private and political choice. However, the forces of the econom-
ics marketplace are more likely to channel individual self-interest into socially desirable
outcomes. See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
